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Abstract 
This article explores the underlying causes for the endurance and decline of single 
party dominance in Botswana and Senegal. The time period includes one-party 
dominance in Botswana under Botswana democratic party (1965-2009) and one-
party dominance in Senegal under the socialist party (1978- 2000). The article 
uses qualitative research strategies with a comparative case study design. The 
investigation is based on a review of previous researches, published reports, 
government documents, and surveys websites. The article provides qualitative 
evidence that supports the argument that incumbent resource advantages are the 
most important underlying factors for the endurance and decline of single party 
dominance in Botswana and Senegal. Further research and quantitative evidence 
is necessary to test whether the same conclusion can be applied to other cases. 
This research contributes to the understanding of one-party dominance in 
developing countries. 
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Single party dominance that is the winning by one party of an absolute 
majority in at least three consecutive elections is an emerging phenomenon 
in African countries.2 In this regard, two developments are worth 
mentioning. On the one hand, there are only few African countries in which 
dominant parties lost election. On the other hand, there is a “worrying trend 
of one-party dominance” on the continent. (Bogaards 2004: 192).Thus, 
there is “an urgent need for systematic research into the nature, sources, 
conditions and consequences of dominant party systems in Africa.” (Ibid). 
There are a few studies devoted to the explanation of one-party 
dominance.3These studies have approached the issue from five directions. 
Some studies take historical background of a party to explain the 
emergence of one-party dominance. (Huntington 1968; Giliomee and 
Simkins 1999). Some other scholars depend on the social cleavage 
approach to explain single party dominance. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
Others invoke the institutional approach which considers electoral law and 
electoral system as determinant of party system in a given political system. 
(Duverger 1954:217). Some consider political culture to explain one-party 
dominance (Schaffer 1998; Cruise O’Brien 1999). Finally, the theory of 
resource advantage considers incumbent resource advantage as the cause 
for the endurance and decline of one-party dominance. (Greene 2007). Of 
these studies, few apply a systematic and comparative approach to explain 
one-party dominance in the African context.4 To the best knowledge of the 
researcher, there is no research work that analyses one- party dominance in 
Botswana and Senegal with a comparative research design. 
                                                 
2 This definition of one party dominance is adopted from   Satori (1976) 
definition of pre-dominant party systems 
3 The few existing studies on single party dominance include: Duverger (1954), 
Tucker (1961), Blondel (1972), Greene (2007), Huntington and Moore (1970), 
Arian and Barnes (1974), Sartori (1976), Pempel (1990), Brooker (2000), and H. 
Giliomee and C. Simkins (1999), J. Wong and E. Friedman (2008), C. Spiess 
(2009), and M. Bogaards and F. Boucek (2010), Rimanelli (1999).Jager and du 
Toit(2013); Doorenspleet and Nijzink(2013). 
4 Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013); Jager and Du Toit (2013) 
 




Thus, this article fills the gaps in research and theory by providing a 
comparative analysis of the underlying causes for the endurance and 
decline of one-party dominance in Botswana under Botswana Democratic 
Party (1965-2009) and Senegal under the Socialist party (1978- 2000). 
Botswana is an interesting case of enduring single party dominance while 
Senegal represents non-enduring single party dominance. 
Methodology and Case Selection 
The study is an exploratory research. It is fully based on the review of 
available studies on one-party dominance in Botswana and Senegal. As the 
main objective of the study is exploring the causal mechanisms of single 
party dominance,  the researcher employs the case study approach which 
has an advantage for a research of an explanatory nature (Gerring 2007: 39; 
Yin 2003:1). 
The cases of this research are selected in line with the most similar 
systems design. Botswana and Senegal are similar (they are free and 
democracies) but differ in the dependent variable (one party dominance). 
The two cases are selected based on their similarity in their level of 
freedom (using the Freedom House Index) and democracy (using Polity IV 
and the Democracy Index).5 Moreover, unlike the dominant parties in most 
African countries and many other cases of one-party dominance in 
developing countries6, the dominant parties in Botswana and Senegal did 
not come out of revolution or armed struggle against colonialism. Despite 
                                                 
5 Freedom House Index 2013:; Polity IV2010; and Economic Intelligence unit 
2013 
6 Gilome and Simkins (1999:3) have shown that unlike dominant parties in 
industrialised countries, the dominant parties in developing countries were not 
born or revitalised in some crisis of political mobilisation. Rather, they were born 
in a much greater trauma or in wake of “a nightmare.” They  come out of a 
background of revolution (Mexico), counter-revolution(Taiwan), apartheid (south 
Africa), colonial rule, foreign occupation and war of insurgency (Malaysia), 
continuing struggle against the communist regime in Beijing (Taiwan), and 
liberation struggle of an indigenous people against social and economic 
subjugation (Malaysia and South Africa). 
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these similarities, Botswana and Senegal differ in the dependent variable 
that is one-party dominance. Botswana represents a case where single party 
dominance endures. In this regard, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 
has won every election since independence in 1965.On the other hand, 
Senegal represents a non-enduring one party dominance. The socialist party 
(PS) won five elections between 1978- 1998. However, the PS lost power 
in the 2000 election. As such, single party dominance is discontinued in 
Senegal.  
After a careful selection of the cases, a comparative method is applied 
in order to identify similarities and differences concerning the factors that 
potentially influence one-party dominance in Botswana and Senegal. Due 
to the small number of cases, the researcher conducted qualitative inductive 
analysis instead of testing a theory. (De Vaus, 2007:263). 
For the purpose of analysis in this study, different factors have been 
identified to explain one-party dominance: Historical Legacy, Social 
Cleavage, Institutions, Political Culture, Government Performance and 
Incumbent Advantage. The subsequent parts provide the analysis of 
discontinued one-party dominance in Senegal and enduring one-party 
dominance in Botswana. It attempts to answer the question why and how 
one-party dominance endures in Botswana but not in Senegal?  
Senegal: The Rise and fall of the PS  
Senegal is the westernmost nation of West Africa. It became the first 
French colony in West Africa in 1895 (Fall 2011:162). Senegal has 
remained a constitutional democracy since independence. Unlike most 
West African countries, Senegal did not experience military coup or civil 
wars. As a result, Senegal is considered one of Africa’s stable, rare 
functioning and shining democracies. (Villalon 1994:163).  
During the colonial period, elections were held in Senegal in which 
native French citizens of Dakar, Goree, Rufisque and St. Louis could elect 
representatives to the municipal council and deputy to the French 
parliament. However, the majority of black Africans were not eligible to 
vote until 1916 after lobbying by Blaise Diagne, the first African Deputy in 
the French Assembly elected in 1914. (Beck 2008:52; Villalón 1994:167). 




In 1945 two more Senegalese; Lamine Gueye and Leopold Sedar Senghor 
served in the French Constituent Assembly. Lamine Gueye founded the 
socialist party while Senghor together with Mamadou Dia founded the 
Senegalese Democratic Bloc (BDS) in 1948. (Gellar 2005: 77-78). 
These political parties dominated pre-independence party competition 
in Senegal. They had advocated the extension of universal suffrage and 
other civil and political rights to indigenous subjects. In 1958, Lamine 
Guèye’s Socialist Party merged with Senghor’s democratic block to 
become the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), known as the Socialist 
Party since 1976. (Ibid). The National Assembly, elected in March 1959 
and made up solely of members of the UPS, adopted the first constitution 
of an independent, unitary Senegal on 26 August, 1960. Leopold Sedar 
Senghor was elected the first President of the Senegalese Republic on 5 
September, 1960. The independence constitution maintained the 
parliamentary regime established by the constitution of 24 January, 1959. 
In 1963, a new constitution that established a presidential regime was 
adopted. 
Senegal broke with the pattern of one party rule in 1974 when it 
recognised an opposition party, Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) under 
the leadership of Abdoulaye Wade. Moreover, Senghor amended the 
constitution in 1976 that made the country a ‘de jure’ three party system. 
Legal recognition was given to three parties representing three ideologies. 
The ruling PS was designated as social democratic, the PDS as liberal 
democratic and the Parti Africain d’Indépendence (PAI) as Marxist–
Leninist. (Creevey, Ngomo and Vengroff 2005: 480).  
All the above three legally recognised parties contested in the 1978 
presidential and parliamentary elections. Senghor defeated Wade with 82.5 
per cent of the vote, and the PS won 82 of the 100 seats in the national 
assembly. However, The PDS won 18 seats.7 The PS dominated the 
political scene until 2000. The only power alternation during the period 
was intraparty that is Senghor handed over power to his successor, Abdu 
Diouf. Senghor officially stepped down in 1981 before the end of his term. 
                                                 
7 African Elections Database accessible at http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
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Diouf amended the constitution in 1981 that eliminated the limits on the 
number of political parties. Diouf also made electoral reforms in 1983. 
These were designed to consolidate Diouf’s power over the PS, create 
opportunities for the opposition to win some National Assembly seats and 
legitimize the presidential succession at the polls. (Creevey, Ngomo and 
Vengroff 2005: 481). 
The end of PS dominance came in the 2000 presidential election and 
later the parliamentary election in 2001. The following part deals with the 
factors that contributed to the endurance and decline of the PS  in Senegal. 
Historical Legacy  
The initial emergence of dominant party in Senegal followed political 
independence from colonialism. However, unlike most African countries 
and many cases of one-party dominance in developing countries, the 
dominant party did not have a legacy of violent or armed struggle for 
independence. Rather, the emergence of one party dominance in Senegal 
was a result of a long history of elections. As such, the influence of 
historical legacy on PS dominance could be seen in the context of 
Senegalese long electoral history, and its founder, the late poet, philosopher 
Leopold Sedar Senghor. (Beck 2008:52-53; Gellar 2005:78; Hartmann 
2013:177) 
Social Cleavages 
Senegal is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. The largest ethnic 
group are the Wolof (43.3%). The vast majority of Senegalese population 
(94%) is muslin that adheres to the Sufi brotherhoods. There seems to be 
agreement among scholars that no distinct social cleavages particularly 
ethnicity and religion play vital role in political mobilisation and 
association in Senegal. As such, the party system and one-party dominance 
in Senegal seems not to be influenced by any particular cleavage. (Creevey, 
Ngomo and Vengroff 2005: 479;Villalon 1995:2; Hartmann 2013:178; 
Cruise O’Brien 1999:324-325) 





Senegal has a semi-presidential system of government and mixed electoral 
system. The system of government has been changing from semi-
presidential to presidential in 1963 constitution, and back to semi-
presidential in 1970s and 2001 constitutions. Despite these changes, a 
powerful president has characterized the core of Senegal’s institutional 
architecture. (Hartmann, 2013:180). The electoral system has also changed 
from Majoritarian to mixed system.  
The influence of executive-legislative relationship on one-party 
dominance seems to be indirect and minimal. (Hartmann 2013:80). 
Electoral rules and institutions, however, seem to have influence over the 
pattern of one-party dominance in Senegal. Mozaffar and Vengroff 
(2002:605) observe that the series of electoral and party reforms since 1963 
seem to reinforce PS dominance. They were also instruments of cementing 
PS legitimacy. The 1963 constitution that created a Majoritarian electoral 
system ensured de facto one party rule. In 1978, a constitutional change 
provided election of 100 seats in national assembly by proportional 
representation (PR). In 1983, electoral reforms introduced a mixed electoral 
system whereby 60 of 120 seats were allocated by proportional on national 
list and the remaining allocated by block plurality. This electoral system 
clearly benefited the incumbent PS. Coordination on plurality seats would 
reduce opportunities to win the PR seats, which the weakly organized 
opposition parties were better positioned to gain. (Hartmann 2013:181; 
Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002:605).  
When we come to presidential election, Senegal has a two round 
system. This system encouraged broad party competition in the first round. 
In the past, this ensured PS dominance and fractionalized the opposition. 
This had helped to fractionalize the opposition, thereby helping to assure a 
PS majority. However, this also provided the opposition the opportunity to 
unite against the incumbent in the 2000 presidential election. (Vengroff and 
Magala 2001:139).  
In the final analysis, we can say that the incumbent manipulated 
electoral system to sustain its dominance. However, the series of reforms 
could have also contributed to the gradual erosion of its power. The 
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researcher concurs with the ideas of Vengroff and Magala (2001:139-159) 
that “while institutional change may be a necessary condition for a 
democratic transfer of power, it is not a sufficient… Institutional reform 
creates opportunities but does not ensure a successful transition.” 
Political Culture 
As it has been described earlier, Senegal has a long and rich electoral 
history starting in the colonial period. A tradition of competition and debate 
existed even in pre-colonial Senegal. As such, the country was not new to 
elections and competition at the time of independence. This well-developed 
political culture of competition and contest finds its evidence in 2000 when 
the incumbent Abdu Diof concedes defeat in the presidential election and 
facilitated the peaceful transfer of power to opposition Abdoulaye wade. 
The peaceful transfer of power here after enabled Senegal to pass 
Huntington’s (1991:266-267) ‘two-turnover test’ of democratic 
consolidation: 
 
By this test, a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or 
group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition 
loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election 
winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power 
to the winners of a later election. Selecting rulers through elections is the 
heart of democracy, and democracy is real only if rulers are willing to 
give up power as a result of elections. 
 
The influence of political culture on one party dominance in Senegal differs 
in rural and urban areas. The consensual understanding of democracy 
among rural people in Senegal could have reinforced PS dominance. This 
can be substantiated by Senegalese meaning of ‘Demokrassai’ emphasizing 
consensus and material benefits. (Cruise O’Brien 1999:323). The 
association of this culture to rural population particularly Muslim 
brotherhoods, the support base of the PS for long, tells its significance. 
However, support to multi-party politics, and difference in urban areas 
cannot be underestimated. Hartman (2013:183) argues that Senegalese 




political culture resisted one party rule in the 1970s. Later, the prevailing 
political culture was not favorable to PS dominance.  
Government Performance 
The analysis of government performance in Senegal under the PS shows 
that the economic condition of Senegalese population did not improve 
since independence in 1960. (Ka and Dewalle 1994). Hartmann (2013:184) 
observes that when senghor handed power over to Diof in 1981, the 
country faced severe economic problems, and the situation in rural areas 
deteriorated since independence. There was also a contraction of 
agricultural production between 1973 and 1984.Throghout the 1970s and 
1980s human development remained lower than in other low income 
countries. Despite such poor government economic performance and 
worsening economic conditions, immediate change of voting behavior did 
not occur. It was only in the 1990s that PS began to lose the support in 
urban areas (Hartmann 2013:185). 
Incumbent Advantages 
As in many African political systems, incumbent advantage seems to be an 
important variable in the study of Senegalese politics given it shares the 
defining features of African politics that is patronage and clientalism. 
Bratton and Van De Walle (1994:459) show that personal patronage 
constitutes the foundation of African political institutions. As a result, 
political transitions in neo-patrimonial African regimes reflect the struggles 
to have access to state resources by establishing the legal rules that can 
ensure participation and competition. Most scholars of Senegalese politics 
seem to agree that Senegalese politics is characterized by patrimonial 
networks such as between Sufi brotherhoods and the state (Hartmann 2013; 
Beck 2008; Oya 2006). 
Beck (2008:1) considers clientalism and patrimonial politics as 
essential features of Senegal’s political system. According to him, the 
entrenchment of Africa’s political incumbents as well as the defeat of PS in 
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the historic presidential election in 2000 can be explained by the complex 
and varied relationship between clientalism and democracy. Beck (1997:2) 
shows that the stability of one-party rule and "presidential monarchy" in 
Senegal were based on personal patronage that pervaded the legislature, 
judiciary, bureaucracy, ruling PS, and a group of communal leaders. Hence, 
Senghor’s patronage incorporates all elected or appointed government and 
party officials blurring the distinction between their legislative, judicial, 
and administrative functions. The state had also full control over all forms 
of mass media. As a result, Senghor monopolized the political game (Ibid: 
8). 
According to Beck (1997), Senghor’s regime did not become military 
dictatorship in the face of economic pressures and opposition since the 
regime avoided political violence and repression8 by becoming 
‘patrimonial democracy’: “political incumbents who undertake political 
liberalization to legitimize their besieged regime, while assuring their 
continued tenure in power by controlling the scope and implementation of 
democratic reforms through their patrimonial relationships.” (Ibid: 2). 
Patronage politics also characterized Senghor’s successor, Abdu Diouf. 
Diouf enjoyed important advantages over the opposition in terms of access 
to the state coffers and party clientelist networks, as well as control over 
the state apparatus that determined the rules of the game (Ibid: 15). He used 
the patronage within the PS to manipulate the electoral code and Muslim 
brotherhoods. Beck (Ibid: 16) states that: 
 
Like Senghor before him, Diouf sought to ingratiate himself to the 
marabouts and their peasant-disciples by erasing their agricultural 
debts and sharply increasing the producer price for peanuts prior to the 
1983 elections. Recipients of various other state "awards" such as large 
infrastructural projects, the leaders of the brotherhoods were persuaded 
                                                 
8 Allen (1995:305-306) notes that in general, military intervention was not used to avert 
what he calls the ‘crisis of clientalism’ after decolonization in Africa. He identifies 
four mechanisms African governments used to avert this crisis: First, retention of 
clientalism combined with control; second, centralization of power in an executive 
presidency; third, use of bureaucracy, instead of party, as distributor of clientelist 
resources; fourth, downgrading of representative institutions. 




to give a public command (ndigal) for their disciples to vote for the PS, 
whereas in the past the marabouts only made vague declarations of 
friendship, while their aides-de-camp quietly conveyed their voting 
instructions to their disciples. 
 
Thus, incumbent advantages seem to be the most important factors behind 
the endurance of PS dominance in Senegal. Patronage networks enabled the 
PS to control the state apparatus including legislature, judiciary, and 
bureaucracy. The strong support that the PS enjoyed from the Muslim 
brotherhoods also showed the prevalence of patronage politics in 
Senegalese society. Even in the face of PS patronage decline, “the desire to 
protect the incumbency of the ruling party extends beyond the party elites 
to their clientelist networks of politicized bureaucrats, local party 
representatives and communal leaders” (Beck, 1997:2). 
The gradual decline of PS dominance strongly correlates with 
shrinking of the Senegalese state in the 1980s. Galvan (2001:59) traces the 
symptom of the PS collapse to the 1988 ballot that coincided with the 
shrinking of the Senegalese state due to implementation of IMF structural 
adjustment in 1985. The structural adjustment had irreversible 
consequences for PS. First, agricultural credits declined. Second, the state 
resources that had financed the ruling patronage link between the ruling 
party and the marabouts also diminished between 1988 and 1993. 
Consequently, the marabouts stopped issuing religious edicts in support of 
Diouf’s ruling party. In subsequent elections, the marabouts adopted a 
stance of political neutrality. By 2000 the PS had become vulnerable 
without the backing of the marabouts.  
According to Levitsky and Way (2010:275), the PS failed to 
reconsolidate power after 1993 presidential election. They mentioned two 
important developments related with the decline and collapse of the PS. 
First, years of fiscal retrenchment and economic reform caused “Patronage 
decompression.” This in turn undermined PS’ capacity to contain elite 
defection. Second, economic liberalization also undermined the Socialists’ 
clientelist ties to Sufi Brotherhoods. Consequently Mouride support 
“dramatically declined.” Most marabouts remained neutral in the 1993 
election, and many of them backed Wade in the 2000 election. 
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According to Villalón (1994:163-164), the viability of the system has 
been threatened due to the economic decline of the 1980s. The influence of 
patronage on single party dominance and decline in Senegal is similar to 
that of Mexico. The PR regime in Mexico used widespread network of 
patronage ties in the context of relatively free and fair elections. Similarly, 
partially free elections have been held in Senegal without threatening PS 
dominance. As in Mexico, the gradual erosion of stability of the system has 
been observed in Senegal in the 1980s. According to Galvan (2001:54), the 
PS experienced “patronage compression” within its ranks since Diouf 
refused to retire. As such, the decisive shift in Senegalese politics came not 
from outside but from within the PS itself. Like Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 
Mexico and James Soong in Taiwan, key political actors within the ruling 
party in Senegal became disaffected and eventually provided the possibility 
of an opposition victory. The splits within the ruling party were facilitated 
by the reasonably civil and democratic norms of elite politics in Senegal 
that prevented Diouf from purging, exiling or imprisoning party rivals 
(Ibid: 54-55). 
Thus, in the context of economic and patronage resources decline, the 
ruling party was plagued by internal competition and factions that led to its 
ultimate collapse. The first major political player to leave the PS was Djibo 
Ka, government minister under both Senghor and Diof. Ka founded Union 
for Democratic Renewal (URD) that won 13.20 percent of seats in the 1988 
legislative elections.The next political figure to leave the PS was former 
foreign minister Mustapha Niasse who started the Alliance des Forces du 
Progrés (AFP). Both Ka and Niasse competed in the 2000 presidential 
election. In the first round, Ka and Niasse won 7.10% and 16.80 
respectively. The incumbent Diof won 41.30 and main opposition 
Abdoulaye Wade won 31.0. In the second round, Diouf remained stuck at 
41.50, Wade masterfully won Ka and Niasse into his camp and won the 
election (Galvan 2001:54-55; Vengroff and Magala 2001:160). 
Botswana: Enduring BDP Dominance 
Botswana is a country situated in southern Africa. It was a British 
Protectorate under the name Bechuanaland. The British declared 




Bechuanaland a protectorate in 1885 at the request of Tswana chiefs. 
Bechuanaland was the most neglected and least developed British 
protectorate in Sothern Africa (Schmitt 2006:31). As a result, Botswana 
was one of the poorest countries in the world when it attained 
independence in 1966. However, the discovery of minerals after 
independence especially diamonds has changed the economic condition in 
Botswana. The country is now a days described as the “Switzerland” of 
Africa and “an African miracle” (Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe 2013:115-
116). 
In its political history, Botswana is the longest enduring democracy in 
Africa. It held its first election in 1965 while still under colonial rule. It is 
different from many African countries in that it has never experienced 
military dictatorship, a military coup or one party rule (Sebudubudu and 
Botlhomilwe 2013: 116; Wiseman 1977:72). Botswana has developed a 
multi-party democracy that allowed the existence of opposition political 
parties. All Political parties emerged in Botswana right before 
independence. The political context and mobilizing agendas revolved 
around colonialism/white supremacy, and the retention or abolition of the 
traditional chieftain system. Especially, the traditional chief political 
system could be said to dominate the political debate in the 1960s. In this 
system, tribal chiefs were powerful accumulators of wealth and controllers 
of economic resources including land, labour and cattle (Good 1992:69). 
Beaulier (2003:228) notes that chiefs played a vital role in determining 
allocation of land for different purposes such as hunting, residences or 
farming, and in managing and resolving conflicts within the tribe and with 
other tribes. Adult males could discuss, consider, and criticise the issues 
raised by tribal chiefs or local headmen in local gatherings called the 
Kgotla (Ibid). Good (1992:70) observes that the Kgotla has been compared 
with classical Athenian polis and big man system in Papua New Guinea 
highland. However, the Kgotla essentially operated to facilitate social 
control by the leadership. Its role was advisory and the chiefs utilised the 
forum to generate consensus for the actions they proposed. It was also 
dominated by privileged elites and interdependence did not necessarily 
involve reciprocity between rich and poor (Ibid). 
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The abolition or maintenance of this traditional system was one of the 
main agenda of the earliest political parties in Botswana. The yet to be 
dominant party Bechuanaland Democratic party (BDP), Bechuanaland 
Independence Party (BIP) and Bechuanaland people’s party (BPP) were the 
three parties that went to the self-government elections in February 1965. 
The BDP, led by Khama, enjoyed a landslide victory in 1965 election by 
obtaining 28 seats while BPP got three, and BIP won no seats.9  
The BDP remained the dominant party in Botswana. It faced serious 
challenges only in 1994 and 2004 elections when the Botswana National 
Front (BNF) won 13 out of 40 and 12 seats out of 44 respectively.10 Thus, 
Botswana has never experienced a regime or political party change. In 
other words, it is one of the cases of enduring single party dominance in 
Africa. The following part assesses the potential causes for the endurance 
of the BDP in Botswana. 
Historical Legacy 
The initial emergence of the BDP and its victory in subsequent elections 
has been attributed to the influence of Sir Seretse Khama who became the 
first president of Botswana in 1965 (Botlhomilwe and Sebudubudu 2011; 
98; Sebudubudu and Botlhomilwe 2013:119). Khama was a key figure in 
modern Botswana history about whom Henderson (1990:27) aptly states 
that “The History of modern Botswana is very much the history of Seretse 
Khama”. Henderson holds that Khama’s leadership saved Botswana either 
from the slur of Bantustan or the possible control of it by neighboring 
South Africa. His influence and legacy in the BDP was rooted in his 
descent, personal history and the vital role he played for the independence 
of Botswana and drafting of the constitution in 1965. 
Khama was borne into the royal family of the Bangwato in Serowe on 
1 July 1921. He was the rightful heir to the chieftaincy that he was to 
                                                 
9 African Elections Database, accessible at http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
10 Ibid 
 




assume upon his return from his studies in Britain. However, the British 
colonial administration and his uncle Tshekedi Khama denied him the 
chieftaincy due to his marriage with a white British woman, Ruth Williams. 
Owing to the prevailing racism and apartheid, the mixed marriage also 
faced strong objection from the authorities in Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa. As a result, Britain banned Khama from returning to Bechuanaland 
unless he renounced his chieftaincy. The Bangwato people supported him. 
They resented against British denial of the chieftaincy and his banishment 
created constant unrest (Henderson 1990; Botlhomilwe and Sebudubudu 
2011:98).  
In 1956, Khama and Ruth Williams were allowed to enter 
Bechuanaland after he renounced the chieftaincy. The Bangwato supported 
Khama when he formed the BDP in 1961. The central district where the 
Bangwato live is the largest district consisting of 37% of the population of 
Botswana. This could explain Khamas’s support base and success of the 
BDP (Botlhomilwe and Sebudubudu 2011:98). Moreover, Khama 
possessed personal attributes, intelligence, integrity and political skill that 
made him an influential leader. Polhemus (1983:401) states that Khama 
“offered a unique combination of modern and traditional qualifications for 
leadership.” Wiseman (1998:248) notes that “In contemporary Africa only 
Nelson Mandela can be seen as possessing the type of immense personal 
authority and prestige enjoyed in the past in Botswana by Seretse Khama.” 
Wiseman (1998:248) argues that the electoral victories of BDP from 
1965 to 1980 are attributable to the personal prestige of Seretse Khama. 
Even for some time after his death, the BDP has been viewed as 'the party 
of Khama’. However, the influence of Khama faded due to generational 
change and passage of time (Ibid). 
Social Cleavage  
Botswana consists of various ethnic groups, tribes, and religious groups. 
Botswana has several tribes that are multi-ethnic and various ethnic groups 
that are multi-tribal. (Charlton 1993:347). Setswana language is the most 
dominant of all the language groups found in Botswana, with at least 70% 
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of the population identifying it as a mother tongue and another 20% using it 
as a second language (Selolwane 2004:4). 
The politically significant cleavages in Botswana run along ethnic and 
class lines. Holm (1987:22) attributes the success of the BDP to its class 
and ethnic base. The BDP is a party of traditional notables, cattle holders 
who make effective electoral campaign. The BDP support base is primarily 
Tswana speaking tribes of Bangwato and Bakwana which constitute 50% 
of the population. Within these ethnic groups, elections are a matter of 
ethnicity. (ibid). 
However, Charlton (1993:345) notes that there is no empirical data on 
individual voting behaviour that can enable us to determine existence of 
ethnic voting in Botswana. As such, he simply takes both ethnicity and 
class as potentially significant factors in any explanation of either party or 
voting behaviour in Botswana. Similarly, Selolwane (2004:43) argues that 
BDP support base cut across all social cleavages. As such, BDP 
incorporates and accommodates different ethnic groups and tribes. In 
addition, the party leaders skilfully manage the differences that could have 
led to violence or conflict (Charlton 1993:48).  
Institutions 
Upon independence in 1966, Botswana adopted a republican government 
that operates a unicameral Westminster parliamentary system. Although 
Botswana is categorized as a parliamentary democracy, it is a mix of 
parliamentary and presidential systems. It varies from the Westminster 
system in that all executive power is vested in the president. (Holm 
1987:21).The president is elected indirectly by parliament. The other 
features of Botswana’s mixed system is that the president has the power to 
appoint and dismiss ministers, ministers are subject to parliamentary 
confidence, and the president can dissolve the parliament. (Sebudubudu 
and Osei-Hwedie 2006:37). 
Botswana uses the simple majority, first past the post (FPTP), electoral 
system. Some scholars argue that simple majority electoral system 
contributes to one-party dominance in Botswana. (Molomo 2005:34; 
Somolokae 2005:24-25). Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2006:42) note that 




FPTP electoral system and the absence of public funding further 
undermines the opposition in Botswana since there is no equal party 
competition for political office. They also note that FPTP disadvantages 
party representation especially for small, opposition parties because of 
distortion of seats. Thus, FPTP reinforces BDP dominance. The opposition 
in Botswana has been calling for a change to proportional representation to 
augment their parliamentary seats. However, the ruling BDP does not 
accept their proposal as it benefits from FPTP electoral system (Ibid: 42). 
Nevertheless Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie note that electoral reform 
alone might not solve the problems of the opposition because of other 
problems such as lack of adequate resources and organizational capacity in 
order to establish branches, nominate candidates for every constituency and 
advertise itself to, or mobilize the public. Also, the opposition suffers from 
absence of public party funding law and their inability to get support from 
private groups (Ibid). 
Political Culture 
The political culture in Botswana can be said to be influenced by pre-
colonial traditional chieftain political system and modern liberal 
democracy. Chiefs were the most powerful figures in the traditional 
political system. There was also a consultative forum for adult male 
members of the community called Kgotla where chiefs discuss political 
issues. Succession of chiefs was ascriptive or hereditary. As such, there 
was no idea of popular election of leaders (Holm 1987:24). Nevertheless 
Tswana traditional culture seems to facilitate representative democracy 
introduced in 1965. 
Holm (1987:24) notes that Kgotla has been used by the BDP to discuss 
policy with local communities seeking consensus for implementation. 
Tswana culture is antithetical to physical violence than other African tribes. 
Tswana culture does not also support extremist organisations and even 
opposition to apartheid South Africa was handled in mildly. Tswana culture 
promotes peaceful approach to interpersonal and social relations. As such, 
“these traditional Tswana values of public discussion, community 
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consensus, non-violence, and moderation are critical elements of a 
democratic political culture”(Ibid). 
The modern political system incorporates traditional political system 
with some modifications with regard to succession. The Botswana 
constitution recognised and defined the authority of traditional local leaders 
(Bagosi). They have no legislative powers, but often arbitrate conflicts in 
local disputes. The chieftainship is traditionally hereditary, but is now an 
appointment and election. The data from Afro barometer (2013) survey 
show that the majority of Batswana still support traditional chiefs.11 
Government Performance 
Botswana can be considered one of the few one-party dominant party 
regimes with high level of government performance. Hillbom (2008:191) 
notes that after forty years since independence, Botswana is referred to as a 
growth miracle, sign of hope for sub-Saharan Africa and exemplar of 
success and prosperity.  
Du Toit (1999:200) attributed the successive electoral victories of the 
BDP in the 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, and 1994 to high government 
performance. He also observes that the electoral performance of BDP 
declined since 1994. He mentioned two factors that can account for this 
decline. First, declining government performance measured in terms of 
rising unemployment, declining economic growth, widening inequalities 
and corruption. Second, the BDP cling to its original support base and was 
not able to attract new category of voters such as urban and working class. 
The impact of both factors manifested in the 1994 election results (Ibid: 
202). In the 1999 elections, the BDP gain improved from 54.59% to 57%. 
This also correlates with improvement of the economy and its boom in 
1999. In contrast to BDP vote improvement, the 1999 election outcomes 
                                                 
11 Afro barometer (2013): Botswana’s Chieftainships Endure despite Democratic 
Consolidations (Press release) 
 




showed declining vote share of main opposition BNF from 45.41% to 43 % 
(ibid). 
However, like many other cases of dominant party systems, 
government performance does not seem to be sufficient to explain one-
party dominance in Botswana. This has been shown in 2009 election where 
the BDP got elected despite economic decline and crisis. Botlhomilwe and 
Sebudubudu (2011: 98) affirm that “The fact that 2009 was a year of 
economic crisis yet the BDP did not experience electoral defeat suggests 
that economic factors may be an important though not a sufficient 
condition to explain the BDP’s electoral performance.” 
Incumbent Advantage 
Botlhomilwe and Sebudubudu (2011) assert that the single most important 
factor for the electoral success of the BDP seems to be incumbent 
advantage: “It is not in dispute that over the years the BDP has exploited 
these advantages to its own benefit in the elections” (2011:98). Greene 
(2013:45) has found that incumbent resource advantage derived from 
public resources is a powerful predictor of BDPs staying power. It uses its 
own and state resources for patronage that helps it to secure wider support 
and deprive the opposition of support (Ibid: 44). In addition to parastatal 
corporations involved in construction, transportation, and services, the 
government is involved in mining copper, nickel, coal and diamond. 
Greene (2013:45) further argues that the BDP can politicise these public 
resources and use them for partisan advantage because it controls the public 
bureaucracy.  
Von Soest (2009) finds out that neo-patrimonial patterns exist in 
Botswana though they are limited when compared to other African 
countries. The BDP secures its position by the provision of public goods 
and limited patrimonial exchanges financed by the country’s revenues from 
diamonds, the South African custom union (SACU), and the Bank of 
Botswana. These revenues enabled the BDP to provide significant benefit 
to all social groups and people believe the ‘BDP’ will deliver the goods.’  
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Charlton (1993:340) notes that the BDP uses its advantage for 
patronage and patron-client ties to cement mass-elite linkages and to 
channel economic success into BDP support. However, Botswana has 
avoided morally and organisationally corrupting personalised patronage 
system that existed in many African countries (Ibid: 341). The popularity 
of the BDP amongst the peasantry has been further reinforced by the 
introduction of rural development programs. The most celebrated of these 
was the Accelerated Rural Development Program (ARDP). The ARDP was 
most famous of these projects and politically motivated implemented 
before 1974 election (Ibid: 605) 
Botlhomilwe and Sebudubudu (2011:98-99) observe that Cabinet 
Ministers, members of Parliament and Councillors also indirectly use their 
official positions to buy support for their party. Worth mentioning is the 
use of government resources to address Kgotla meetings in all parts of the 
country. These meetings cannot be used by the opposition because they are 
not arenas to campaign but to tell people about the success of government 
and its plan in the future. Even if an opposition Member of Parliament can 
participate, he/she can only advertise government programs. In addition, 
the government controlled media, Radio Botswana and Botswana 
Television, have also contributed to the poor performance of the 
opposition. They give unfair coverage to the BDP especially where 
political rallies are addressed by the president and his deputy. “The bias of 
the state media against opposition parties has a serious impact especially in 
view of the fact that none of the opposition parties owns a television, radio 
station or even a newspaper”(Ibid 2011:99). 
Osei-Hwedie (2001:60) observes that owing to its command of 
sufficient resources, the BDP has organizational and financial strength 
when compared to opposition parties. The BDP has its head quarter in the 
capital Gaborone and branches in all constituencies that nominating 
candidates in all parliamentary and council constituencies, running 
campaigns for all its candidates, formulating a new updated election 
manifesto in each successive election year, and mobilisation of voters: “It 
is its ability to get its supporters actually to vote on election day, through 
transportation and door-to-door appeals, which actually makes the 
difference in terms of getting the vote.”(Ibid). 




Comparative Analysis of the Findings for Botswana and Senegal 
The previous discussions of each case have described the six underlying 
mechanisms: historical legacy; social cleavage; institutions; political 
culture; government performance; and incumbent advantage. Based on 
these discussions, we can now compare the findings for Botswana and 
Senegal and conclude about the most important underlying factors for the 
endurance and decline of one-party dominance. 
First, the influence of historical legacy on initial dominance has been 
significant in Botswana and Senegal. Although the political elites did not 
lead a violent struggle against colonial rule, they had an important role in 
the decolonisation process. In this regard, the influence of founding 
president Senghor in Senegal and Khama in Botswana is notable. However, 
the influence of historical legacy in both cases faded after sometime. 
Second, in terms of social cleavage, there exist a striking similarity 
between the two cases, that is dominant ethnic groups, the Tswana in 
Botswana and the Wolof in Senegal, characterise their nations .However, 
no distinct social cleavage forms a basis of political mobilisation. Instead, 
the dominant political parties in Botswana and Senegal seem to transcend 
and cut across various social cleavages. This could have contributed to the 
endurance of single party dominance in both cases. However, social 
cleavage seems not be a sufficient condition to explain decline of single 
party dominance.  
Third, the influence of institutions especially electoral systems on one 
party dominance seems to be mixed. It has been shown that despite the 
different types of electoral systems adopted by Botswana and Senegal, 
electoral systems in both countries seem to have impacted the endurance of 
single party dominance. However, electoral system is not a sufficient 
condition to explain the decline of single party dominance. 
Fourth, political culture can provide favourable or unfavourable 
ground for single party dominance. In Botswana, the conservative political 
culture appeared to reinforce one-party dominance. However, recent survey 
data reveal the majority of Batswana support democracy and multi-party 
competition. In Senegal, Wolof understanding of demokaraasi seems to 
have influenced endurance of the PS. However, political cultures in towns 
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were not favourable for PS dominance. Recent survey data reveal that 
Senegalese supported democracy and multi-party competition after the 
collapse of the PS. 
Fifth, Although Botswana and Senegal demonstrate differences 
concerning government performance, this has been revealed not to be 
directly related with decline of one-party dominance. Poor government 
performance did not prevent the PS from dominating Senegalese politics 
and it did not directly cause its decline either.  
Sixth, incumbent advantages have been shown to be the most 
important factors for the endurance and decline of one-party 
dominance.The results for Senegal have revealed that incumbent advantage 
seems to be the most important underlying mechanism behind one-party 
dominance and decline. The PS in Senegal abused state resources for 
patronage politics within the PS, state institutions and Muslim 
brotherhoods.The Senegalese case indicates that the decline of one-party 
dominance is correlated with the decline of state capacity and incumbent 
resources. The shrinking of government size including state-owned 
companies due to increasing privatization seems to correlate with decline 
of single party dominance. This lack of and decline of incumbent 
advantage has been shown to result in the gradual de-alignment of 
important social support groups from the dominant party, defection of 
major political players and finally the defeat of the PS.  
This indicates why one-party dominance still endures in Botswana. 
The BDP endures because it still controls states resources and can use the 
revenue from state owned enterprises for electoral gain.The BDP has 
access to diamond revenue, exploits big government size, and state owned 
enterprises. The BDP also uses limited patronage and distribution of 
materials to people demonstrating to them that supporting government 
brings material benefits. Moreover, the BDP has other advantages: 
exploitation of agricultural programs to get the support of the rural 
communities; exclusive use of traditional political institutions, the kgotla, 
in order to discuss achievements of the government; and the government 
control of the media including radio and newspapers. 
 





This article has sought to explore the underlying causes for the endurance 
and decline of single party dominance in Botswana and Senegal. The study 
sought to answer the general question why and how one-party dominance 
has endured in Botswana but not in Senegal? The six factors identified as 
explanatory variables include: historical legacy; social cleavage; 
institutions; political culture; government performance; and incumbent 
advantage. The comparative analysis of Botswana and Senegal reveals 
incumbent advantage as the most important underlying mechanism that 
explains the endurance and decline of single party dominance in Botswana 
and Senegal. 
The endurance of BDP dominance has been shown to be related with 
the incumbent advantage BDP possesses. The decline of one party 
dominance in Senegal has been correlated with the decline of incumbent 
advantage due to privatization. The results for Senegal have several 
implications for the analysis of the endurance of one-party dominance in 
Botswana and democratization process in other similar cases.  
First, the Senegalese case indicates that dominant parties cannot 
survive without access to state resources and state owned enterprises. It is 
interesting to note that decline of incumbent advantages has undermined 
the capacity of the PS to abuse political institutions, exploit social groups, 
and to establish patronage within the party leadership and society. Second, 
the results for Senegal imply that privatization of state owned companies 
and economic liberalization in general may open the door for truly liberal 
democracy.  
 




Afro barometer. 2009. “Summary of democracy indicators, Senegal 2002-
2008” http://www.afrobarometer.org 
Afro barometer.2009. “Summary of democracy indicators, Botswana 1999-
2008” http://www.afrobarometer.org 
Afro barometer.2013. “Botswana’s Chieftainships Endure despite 
Democratic Consolidations (Press release)”. 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/press_release 
African Elections Database. http://africanelections.tripod.com 
Arian, A. and Barnes, S. 1974. "The Dominant Party System: A Neglected 
Model of Democratic Stability." The Journal of Politics 36(3):592-
614. 
Beaulier, S. A. 2003. “Explaining Botswana’s success: the critical role of 
post-colonial policy” Cato Journal 23(2):227-240 
Beck, L. J. 2008. Brokering Democracy in Africa: the rise of clientelist 
democracy in Senegal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
__________1997. “Senegal's Patrimonial Democrats: Incremental Reform 
and the Obstacles to the Consolidation of Democracy” Canadian 
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 
31(1):1-31 
Blondel, J. 1972. Comparing Political Systems. New York: Prager 
Bogaards, M. 2004. “Counting Parties and identifying Dominant Party 
Systems in Africa.” European Journal of Political Research 43:173-
197. 
Bogaards, M. and Boucek, F .2010. Dominant Political Parties and 
Democracy. London: Routledge. 
Botlhomilwe, M. Z. and Sebudubudu, D. 2011. “Elections in Botswana: A 
Ritual Enterprise?” The Open Area Studies Journal 4:96-103 
Bratton, M. and De Walle, N.V. 1994. “Neo-patrimonial Regimes and 
political transitions in Africa” World Politics 46(4):453-489 
Brooker, P. 2000. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and 
Politics. New York: St Martin's Press. 
Charlton, R. 1993. “The politics of elections in Botswana” Africa 
63(3):330-370  




Creevey, L., Ngomo, P., and Vengroff, R. 2005. “Party Politics and 
Different Paths to Democratic Transitions: A Comparison of Benin 
and Senegal.” Party Politics 11(4): 471–493 
Cruise O’Brien, R. 1999. “Does Democracy require an opposition party? 
Implications of some recent African Experience” In H. Giliomee and 
C. Simkins, editors. The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination 
and Democracy. Australia: Harwood academic publishers, pp.323-340 
De Vaus, D. A. 2001. Research Design in Social Research. Sage 
Publications: London. 
Doorenspleet, R. and Nijzink, L. editors. 2013. One Party Dominance in 
African Democracies. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Du Toit, P. 1999. “Bridge or Bridgehead? Comparing the party systems of 
Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi” In H. Giliomee 
and C. Simkins, editors. The awkward embrace: One-party domination 
and democracy. Australia: Harwood acdemic publishers 
Duverger, M. 1954. Political Parties: their Organization and activity in the 
Modern state. New York: wiley. 
Fall, I. M. 2011. “Senegal” In Ismaila Madior Fall, etal, editors. Election 
Management Bodies in West Africa: A comparative study of the 
contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of 
democracy. Dakar: Open Society Foundations. 
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2013”accessible at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org 
Galvan, D. C. 2001. “Political turnover and social change in Senegal” 
Journal of democracy 12(3):51-62 
Gellar, S. 2005. Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Gerring, J. 2007: Case studies Research: principles and practices. 
Cambridge: Cambridge university press 
Giliomee, H. and Simkins, C. 1999. The Awkward Embrace. London: 
Routledge. Australia: Harwood academic publishers. 
Good, K.1992. “Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana” The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 30(1):69-95 
Greene, K.F.2007.Why Dominant Parties lose: Mexico's Democratization 
in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Amsalu Tebeje  
 
26 
________________2013. “The political costs of privatization: why 
democratic and authoritarian dominant parties meet their doom.” In 
Nicola de Jager and Pierre Du Toit, editors. Friend or Foe? Dominant 
party systems in southern Africa: Insights from developing world. 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Hartmann, C. 2013. “Senegal: the rise and fall of one-party dominant 
system” In: Renske Doorenspleet, and Lia Nijzink, editors. One-Party 
Dominance in African Democracies. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
Henderson, W. 1990. “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.” African 
Affairs 89(354):27-56 
Hillbom, E. 2008. “Diamonds or development?” a structural assessment of 
Botswana’s forty years of success.” Journal of Modern African Studies 
46(2):191–214. 
Holm, J. D.1987. “Botswana: a paternalistic democracy” World Affairs 
150(1):21-30 
Huntington, S and C. H. Moore. 1970. Authoritarian Politics in Modern 
Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Dominant Systems. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Huntington, S. 1968. Political order in changing societies. New Haven and 
London: Yale University press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press. 
Jager, N. D. and Du Toit, P. 2013. Friend or Foe? Dominant party systems 
in southern Africa: Insights from developing world. Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press 
Ka, S., and De Walle, N. V. 1994. “Senegal: stalled reform in a dominant 
party system.” In S. Haggard and S.B.Webb, editors. Voting for 
reform: democracy, political liberalization, and economic adjustment. 
Oxford: published for the World Bank, oxford university press. 
Levitsky, S. and Way, L. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid 
Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, 
and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan, 
editors, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross–National 
Perspectives. New York: Free Press. 




Molomo, M. G. 2005. “Electoral systems and Democracy in Botswana” In: 
Maudeni Zibani (editor), 40 years of democracy in Botswana: 1965-
2005. Gaborone, Botswana: Mmegi Publishing House. 
Mozaffar, S. and Vengroff, R. 2002. “A ‘whole system’ approach to the 
choice of electoral rules in democratizing countries: Senegal in 
comparative perspective” Electoral Studies 21:601–616 
Osei-Hwedie, B. Z. 2001. “The Political Opposition in Botswana: the 
politics of factionalism and fragmentation.” Transformation 45:57-77 
Oya, C.2006. ‘Regimi di accumulazione, democrazia e struttura di classe in 
Senegal’ [Accumulation regimes, democracy and class structures in 
Senegal], Afriche e Orienti VIII (3-4): 22-44. 
Pempel, T. 1990. Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant 
Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Polhemus, J. H. 1983. “Botswana Votes: Parties and Elections in an 
African Democracy “The Journal of Modern African Studies 
21(3):397-430 
Polity IV Country Report .2010. “Botswana “accessible at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org 
Polity IV Country Report 2010: “Senegal” accessible at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org 
Rimanelli, M. 1999. Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change 
in Single-Party-Dominant Countries. New York: St Martin's Press. 
Sartori, G. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schaffer, F.C. 1998. Democracy in translation: understanding politics in 
unfamiliar culture. Ithaca, New York: Cornell university press 
Schmitt, Debora A. 2006. The Bechuanaland pioneers and gunners. 
Westport: Prager publishers 
Sebudubudu, David and Botlhomilwe, M.Z. 2013. “Interrogating the 
dominant party system in Botswana” In: Nicola De Jager and Pierre 
Du Toit, editors. Friend or Foe? Dominant party systems in southern 
Africa: Insights from the Developing World .Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press. 
Sebudubudu, David and Osei-Hwedie, Bertha Z. 2006. “Pitfalls of 
parliamentary democracy in Botswana” Africa Spectrum 4(1):35-53 
 Amsalu Tebeje  
 
28 
Selolwane, O.D. 2004. “Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the 
Public Sector in Botswana” United Nations research institute for 
social development 
Somolokae, G. 2005. “Political parties in Botswana” EISA research report 
no.27 
Spiess, C. 2009. Democracy and Party Systems in Developing Countries: A 
comparative Study of India and South Africa. New York: Routledge. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2012. “Democracy Index 2012: 
Democracy at a standstill” www.eiu.com 
Tucker, R. 1961. "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes." 
American Political Science Review, 55(2):281-289. 
Vengroff, R. and Magala, M. 2001. “Democratic Reform, Transition and 
Consolidation: Evidence from Senegal's 2000 Presidential Election” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 39(1):129-162 
Villalon, L. A. 1994. “Democratizing a quasi-democracy: the Senegalese 
elections of 1993” African Affairs 93:163-193 
_________ . 1995. Islamic society and state power in Senegal: Disciples 
and citizens in Fatick. Cambridge: Cambridge university press 
Von Soest, C. 2009. “Stagnation of a “Miracle”: Botswana’s Governance 
Record Revisited” GIGA Working paper 99 
Wiseman, J. A.1977. “Multipartism in Africa: The Case of Botswana.” 
African Affairs76 (302):70-79 
_____________. 1998. “The slow evolution of the party system in 
Botswana” Journal of Asian and African studies33 (3):241-264 
Wong, J. E. and E. Friedman. 2008. Political Transitions in Dominant Party 
States: Learning to lose. London: Routledge. 
Yin, R. K. 2003. Case study research: Design and Methods, third edition. 
London: Sage publications. 
 
 
